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ABSTRACT 
We develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates service intensity and endogenous 
contract choice into the standard labour supply framework. We apply our model to data 
collected on specialist physicians working in Quebec (Canada). These physicians are typically 
paid a fee-for-service (FFS) contract. Our panel data set covers a period of policy reform which 
allowed physicians either to remain on FFS or to adopt a mixed remuneration (MR) contract, 
under which they receive a per diem as well as a reduced FFS. We estimate the preference 
parameters of physicians governing the choice of contract and their hours worked and services 
provided. We use our estimates to simulate labour supply elasticities, to predict (ex ante) the 
effects of contracts on physician behaviour, and to evaluate selection effects. The supply of 
services is reduced under a MR contract, suggesting incentives matter. The hours spent seeing 
patients is less sensitive to incentives than the supply of services. Our results suggest that a 
reform forcing all physicians to adopt the MR system would have had substantially larger effects 
on physician behaviour than were measured under the observed reform. 
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1 Introduction
Physicians can affect their output at work through two basic margins: their hours spent at work and
their volume of services per hour (McGuire, 2000). Yet, empirical studies of physician labour supply
typically concentrate on either hours of work (e.g., Showalter and Thurston, 1997; Ferrall, Gregory,
and Tholl, 1998; Baltagi, Bratberg, and Holmas, 2005; Andreassen, Di Tommaso, and Strom, 2013;
Kalb, Kuehnle, Scott, Cheng, and Jeon, 2018) or health care provision (Feldstein, 1970; Devlin and
Sarma, 2008; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014). Generalized models, which simultaneously analyse de-
cisions over hours and services per hour (or service intensity) permit a more complete portrait of
physician behaviour and allow for a richer policy evaluation environment. For instance, suppose
that the government changes physician contracts, reducing incentives to perform services. If ser-
vices per hour are negatively affected by this change while hours are not, then more physicians
must be trained and hired to keep the supply of services constant and meet demand. Models that
concentrate uniquely on hours of work will miss such effects. This issue is particularly relevant in a
context of aging population. To date, little attempt has been made to analyse service intensity and
hours of work together in empirical work.
In this paper, we develop and estimate a generalized physician labour supply model that com-
bines reactions on both hours worked and services per hour. We provide a unified framework in
which we can determine which margin is more sensitive to changes in incentives. Also, our model
takes into account the particular nature of the environment in which physicians are working by
distinguishing between clinical and non-clinical services. The latter includes for instance teaching
and administrative activities (see Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer, 2008).
We specify utility as a function of consumption, hours of work and service intensity.1 Contracts
are composed of an hourly wage rate and a piece rate per unit of service provided. The marginal
return on an hour of work is thus endogenous and depends on service intensity. Similarly, the
marginal return on service intensity depends on hours of work. These nonlinear prices are ana-
logue to those obtained in quantity/quality models (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Assuming a contin-
uous labour supply approach, some comparative static results are derived. In particular, we show
that the compensated (Hicksian) supply curves of hours and services are positively sloped in the
wage rate and the piece rate, respectively. In a more realistic model, the physician has the choice
between two contracts: a fee-for-service (FFS) contract composed uniquely of a piece rate and a
mixed remuneration (MR) contract composed of a wage rate per hour worked and a reduced piece
rate. We show that this environment gives rise to a non-convex budget set, from which we derive
an efficient budget constraint (the upper envelope of the contract-specific budget constraints).
We apply our model to the practice behaviour of specialist physicians working in the Province of
1In our model, the quality of a service (e.g., in terms of its impact on a patient’s health) is assumed the same regardless
of how long the service takes to provide. This assumption is necessary given that no data are available on service quality.
This important point will be discussed in detail later in the paper.
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Quebec (Canada) between the years 1996-2002. All these physicians work within the Quebec public
Health-Care System. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the parameters of each contract are
exogenous for a physician. Our data contain information on individual physician labour supply
(weekly hours spent seeing patients, weekly hours spent performing administrative tasks or teach-
ing, and weeks worked per year) as well as the number of services provided by each physician per
year and the fees for service and the per diem for each contract. The observation period also spans
an important reform in physician compensation which we exploit to identify our model. Prior to
1999, most specialist physicians in Quebec (92%) were paid FFS public contracts, receiving a fee for
each service provided. In 1999, the government introduced a non-mandatory mixed remuneration
(MR) scheme, under which physicians received a (half) per diem, paid for 3.5 hours worked, and a
reduced fee-for-service.
To estimate the model, we assume that preferences are (directly) independent of the compensa-
tion system. This implies that rational, unconstrained physicians will locate on the efficient budget
constraint—the budget constraint that maximizes a physician’s income for each possible combi-
nation of practice variables in his choice set. We derive the efficient budget constraint from our
knowledge of the physician’s contracts. We pay careful attention to the complications created by
the institutional constraints imposed on these contracts within the Quebec Health-Care System (e.g.,
income ceilings, regionally differentiated remuneration, and constraints on the choice of the com-
pensation system at the individual level).2 The simultaneous modelling of the allocation of time,
work intensity and institutional constraints introduces strong nonlinearities into the budget con-
straint. To account for these nonlinearities in estimation, we discretize the choice set available to
physicians (Zabalza, Pissarides, and Barton, 1980). This methodology is relatively free of restric-
tions (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch, 1990), imposing only that the marginal utility of income is
positive (van Soest, 1995).
We then solve for the utility function parameters that generate the observed practice patterns
as optimal choices along the efficient budget constraint. To account for selection we allow for het-
erogeneity in preferences (both observable and unobservable), estimating a mixed-logit model (Mc-
Fadden and Train, 2000).3 To minimize the effects of functional forms on our results, we use a
flexible (quadratic) utility function. In order to limit computational time in estimation and to re-
duce the problem of heterogeneity in the nature of services provided, we restricted our sample to
one speciality—pediatrics. This specialty provides high variability in the participation in MR—44%
of pediatricians opted for MR in the year 2000 as compared with 31% for all specialities. The vol-
untary nature of the reform further complicates estimation, for the following reason. The decision
to adopt MR was not individual specific, but determined at the department level within hospitals.4
2For simplicity sake and given the high average physicians’ gross income, we assume that their (federal + provincial)
income marginal tax rate fall in the highest tax bracket.
3These authors have shown that, under mild regularity conditions, any discrete choice model derived from random
utility maximization has choice probabilities that can be approximated as closely as one pleases by a mixed-logit model.
4Members of each department (groups of specialists working in the same field) would vote on the adoption of MR;
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Consequently, individual physicians could be constrained in their choice of a compensation sys-
tem. Accounting for constraints on choice leads to a mixture of likelihoods wherein the probability
of being constrained is estimated along with the other parameters.
Our results suggest that weekly hours elasticities are quite small while the (compensated) elas-
ticities of service intensity and services with respect to the fee per service are much stronger, be-
ing estimated at about 0.303 and 0.373, respectively. Our results also suggest that the changes in
incentives brought about by the 1999 reform significantly affected physician behaviour. Services
completed decreased by 5.32% and non-clinical hours increased by 6.52%. What is more, service
intensity decreased by 4.78% (less services per clinical hour). A mandatory reform, forcing all
physicians to work under MR, would have reduced services by 9.03% and increased non-clinical
hours by 12.04%. However, these larger effects have little to do with unobserved heterogeneity and
selection. More important are the constraints placed on individual choice in the observed reform.
Simulations using our mixed-logit model estimates also allow us to evaluate selection effects on
unobservables for the subgroups of physicians who prefer MR and FFS, respectively. Our results
indicate that MR physicians provide fewer services and spend more time per service, on average,
than do FFS physicians. The differences are not substantial. This confirms that when exogenous
observables (gender and age) are controlled for, the selection problem on unobservables does not
seem to be important.
The reform was also costly, increasing payments to physicians by over 9.95% . This is due to
the large per diem that physicians were paid for working under MR. We investigate the effects of
a constant-cost reform, under voluntary participation in MR. Under such circumstances, services
provided would decrease relative to the FFS contract by 4.50%, the clinical hours worked by only
0.75% and service intensity by 3.78%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model that we will use
in this paper. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the FFS and MR systems and derives
the physician’s budget constraint. Section 4 presents our data and summary statistics. Section 5
adapts the model of Section 2 to the institutional details of the Quebec reform and develops our
econometric model. Section 6 describe our empirical results, the policy simulations, and an analysis
of selection related to the decision of participating in MR. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
2 A generalized model of labour supply
For expositional purposes, we first present a static model of continuous choice labour supply under
linear contracts. Our model allows for decisions over hours of work and service intensity. Our goal
is to motivate our empirical analysis and our estimation strategy within a simplified setting. Later
we will adapt the model to fit the specific institutional details of physician labour supply in Quebec.
adoption required unanimous approval.
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Preferences are represented by a continuous and twice-differentiable utility function
U(X, h, s), (1)
where X is consumption, h is hours of work, and s is service intensity, that is, the number of services,
S, performed per hour of work. h and s correspond to the physician’s practice variables.5 We
suppose
UX > 0, Uh < 0, Us < 0, (2)
where the latter inequality is justified by assuming that an increase in service intensity reduces on-
the-job leisure, which is assumed a desirable good. From the definition of service intensity one
has6:
S = sh. (3)
The budget constraint is given by
X = wh + pS + y, (4)
where X is the numéraire, w is the wage rate, p is the fee per unit of service and y is non-labour in-
come. The variables w and p are treated as exogenous. This is consistent with the public health-care
system in Quebec where physicians’ remuneration parameters are determined at the government
level. Note that the budget constraint, given by eq. (4), is general enough to account for many
contracts of interest: setting w = 0 and p > 0 gives the FFS contract, setting w > 0 and p = 0 gives
a fixed-wage contract, while setting w > 0 and p > 0 gives a mixed contract.
Four important remarks are in order concerning our model. First, as mentioned in the introduc-
tion, our approach omits the quality of services in the utility function (or alternatively, we assume
that quality is fixed in our model). We acknowledge that this is a strong assumption, but it is neces-
sary in the absence of data on quality. In Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008, p.301), we showed
that our utility function can be derived from a more general model in which services per hour enter
utility for two reasons: first because it is an input of the work practice of the physician, and second
because of ethical concerns, it is derived from the effects of quality on patients’ health. However we
cannot identify the structural effect on health without data on health outcomes. We therefore omit
quality from the utility function in our specification.
5Our simple model considers only one kind of service and one kind of work hours. The empirical model will general-
ize the approach to two different kinds of both services (billable/non-billable) and hours of work (clinical/non clinical)
so as to take into account the particularities of the reform.
6One interpretation of (3) is a (Cobb-Douglas) production function. In a more general model, this function could be
written as S = S(e, h; z), with e denoting effort and z denoting an exogenous vector of inputs that affect the marginal
productivity of effort and hours worked. Absent information on effort and on z in our data set, we approximate the
production function by eq. (3).
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Second we assume complete and symmetric information. Therefore we ignore agency problems
and moral hazard. This is a direct consequence of the fact that the utility function is assumed to
depend on hours of work and the service intensity, both being observable variables.
Third, we suppose that the worker has complete control over his practice variables—freely
choosing both his hours of work and his clinical services. This rules out constraints to supply
or any demand shocks that might affect a physician’s practice, allowing us to concentrate on the
supply side of the medical market which considerably simplifies the empirical analysis.7
Fourth, in its most general form, our model combines traditional labour supply analysis with a
piece-rate model, giving rise to non-linear (and endogenous) prices in the budget constraint. This
can be seen by substituting (3) into (4), adding and subtracting psh, and rearranging. This gives
X = (w+ ps)h+ (ph)s+ yv, where yv = y− phs is the virtual non-labour income. It follows that the
marginal return to an hour of work, w+ ps, depends on the physician’s choice of service intensity—
the number of services that can be performed in that hour. Similarly, the marginal return to service
intensity, ph, depends on the physician’s hours of work. Since service intensity changes the number
of services performed per hour, the return to service intensity depends on the number of hours
worked. These nonlinear prices are similar to those obtained in quantity/quality models (Becker
and Lewis, 1973).
The nonlinear prices give rise to a non-convex budget set (see Appendix A.2). The second-order
conditions for an interior solution require that the curvature of indifference surfaces be more pro-
nounced than the curvature of the budget set. We assume this to be the case and denote the optimal
solution (X?, h?, s?). In Appendix A.3 we show that (X?, h?, s?) is equivalent to (X′, h′, S′/h′) which
maximizes the transformed utility:
u(X, h, S) (5)
subject to
X− pS− wh = y,
where (5) is obtained by substituting s = S/h directly into the utility function (1): u(X, h, S) =
U(X, h, S/h). Hence we can identify the parameters determining optimal behaviour using either
program: Max (1) s.t. (3) and (4), or Max (5) s.t. (4). In most of the following, we concentrate
on the transformed program. One advantage is that all arguments of the transformed utility are
well-defined over the whole choice set; service intensity is not defined in (1) when hours are set at
zero.
The non-linearities in the budget constraint complicate the comparative statics of the model.
For example, an increase in non-labour income, y, will affect the worker’s choices of service inten-
sity and hours of work through two channels: the first is the standard income effect, the second
7This assumption seems reasonable within the context of a public health-care system such as in Quebec where long
waiting lists for physicians’ services render the demand side of the market relatively passive. Excess demand also reduces
any incentive of physicians for demand inducement, which we also ignore.
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is through its impact on the endogenous marginal returns to service intensity and hours of work.
Some results are possible however. The fact that the budget constraint is linear in S and h implies
that the expenditure function is concave in w and p. Hence, under the assumption that the trans-
formed utility function is quasi-concave within the relevant region of analysis, we have
∂h̃
∂w
≥ 0; ∂S̃
∂p
≥ 0, (6)
where ˜ indicates that the partial is compensated. Notice however that one cannot sign cross-partial
derivatives (or elasticities). Therefore,
∂h̃
∂p
>
<
0. (7)
Similarly, since service intensity is the ratio of services to hours worked, its compensated elasticity
with respect to p is given by:
η̃s,p = η̃S,p − η̃h,p, (8)
which is unsigned. Indeed, while η̃S,p ≥ 0, the sign of η̃h,p is indeterminate. These results follow
from a straightforward application of duality theory to the problem of maximizing (5) s.t. (4); we
include a derivation in Appendix A.4 for completeness.
2.1 Endogenous Compensation Choice
Introducing the choice of a compensation system complicates the analysis somewhat. We consider
two cases: a fee-for-service (FFS), or piece rate, system (X = pS) and a mixed remuneration (MR)
system (X = wh + αpS), where 0 ≤ α < 1 denotes the discount rate on the fee-for-service pay-
ment (setting α = 0 gives a fixed-wage compensation system). To proceed we note that UX > 0.
Moreover, we assume that preferences are (directly) independent of the compensation system. This
implies that rational workers will always select the compensation system that maximizes income for
a given (h, S) combination. We therefore proceed in two steps: first we determine the efficient budget
constraint, the upper envelope of X attainable from each value of (h, S). Assuming for simplicity
zero non-labour income, we have
X(h, S; w, p, α) = max
D∈{0,1}
[(1− D)pS + D(wh + αpS)], (9)
where D is a dummy variable is equal to one when the worker participates in the MR system.
Second, the worker solves his (transformed) program by choosing the (X?, h?, S?) combination that
maximizes his utility along the efficient budget constraint (9). The choice of a compensation system
is then given by
D(h?, S?; w, p, α) = arg max
D∈{0,1}
[(1− D)pS? + D(wh? + αpS?)]. (10)
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Figure 1: Optimal Choices Along the Efficient Budget Constraint
S?MRA S
?FFS
A S
?FFS
B
MR
FFS
AFFS
AMR
BFFS
Services(S)
Income(X)
Note. The Figure illustrates the endogenous selection into compensation schemes based on physicians preferences. Clinical hours are
held constant.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which considers the tradeoff between services and consumption
(income), conditional on h? FFS, the optimal hours under the fee-for-service system.8 The budget
line FFS has slope p, the marginal monetary return to completing services under FFS; it passes
through the origin because hours are not remunerated under FFS. The values of S, X chosen under
FFS correspond to the optimal values S? FFS and X? FFS. The line MR illustrates the tradeoff between
services and income under MR, holding hours fixed at h? FFS. It cuts the y-axis at wh? FFS and has
slope equal to αp, reflecting the reduced fee-for-service payments received under MR.9
8Notice that optimal hours under FFS are not in general equal to zero, even though w = 0. This is due to the fact that
the marginal return to hours includes both wage and the marginal effect of hours on FFS income (= w + ps). From the
first-order conditions, we have −UhUX = w + ps.
9Under a fixed-wage system (α = 0) the monetary return to services provided is zero. A strict interpretation of
the model under these circumstances would imply zero services. However, relatively straightforward extensions to the
model would allow for positive services being allowed at the optimum. One possibility is to assume that Us > 0 for
s < s̄, due for instance to concern of the physician for his patients. Another is to assume that monitoring allows for a
minimum level of service intensity to be enforced.
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The efficient budget constraint associated with the transformed program is given by the bold
line.10 It is piece-wise linear and non-convex; this raises well-known problems for optimization
and labour supply estimation (Hausman, 1985) the choice set of workers (physicians), considering
only a finite set of values for h, S (van Soest, 1995).
Figure 1 also illustrates potential problems of self-selection. Workers who have a preference for
low service intensity levels (such as worker A, who chooses S?FFSA under FFS) will tend to choose
MR, while those who have a preference for high service intensity levels (such as worker B, who
chooses S?FFSB under FFS) will tend to choose FFS. A comparison of behaviour across compensation
systems will potentially confound the effects of the compensation system with the differences in
preferences. This is the case since the marginal return of services and the (virtual) non-labour in-
come are endogenous, as they may vary at the optimum depending on the form of the indifference
curves (compare A1 and B0). The econometric model must therefore allow for both observable and
unobservable heterogeneity to take into account of possible selection bias.
3 Institutions: Physician Remuneration in Quebec
Health care is under provincial jurisdiction in Canada. Each province determines physician com-
pensation systems and their level of pay. Within the Province of Quebec, physicians have tradition-
ally been paid according to a fee-for-service compensation system.11 Under this system, physicians
receive a fee for each service provided. The fees paid are service specific, accounting for the dif-
ficulty and time intensiveness of the service provided. Our empirical work will account for these
differences by constructing index numbers of services and prices.12 In the present section, for expo-
sitional purposes, we take as given that there is one type of service, denoted S, and one fee, denoted
p. The physician’s budget constraint is then given by
X̂FFS = pS. (11)
In 1999, the government introduced a Mixed Remuneration scheme. Under this system, special-
ist physicians receive a wage (or per diem) for time spent at work in hospital (or other recognized
health-care establishments). (Half) per diems are paid for periods of 3.5 hours of work. To receive the
per diem, a physician must explicitly declare the time period under which he is working under MR
("on the per diem"). During this period the physician is allowed to perform certain activities within
a hospital. These activities include seeing patients, administrative services, and teaching; research
activities are not covered. In practice, per diems of D = $300 are claimed in d = 3.5 hour blocks, up
10To be exact, this is the efficient budget constraint conditional on h?,FFS, the unconditional efficient budget constraint
varies with h as well as S.
11We ignore the cases of salaried physicians and physicians paid by vacation, which represents a small part (about 8%)
of physicians before 1999 and a still smaller part afterwards.
12The construction of the index numbers for all prices and services is outlined in the next section and described in
detail in the Appendix, Section A.1.
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to 28 over a two-week period. The per diem was increased to $335 in 2003. Services provided dur-
ing this period fall into two categories: billable services, denoted SB, are remunerated at a reduced
fee-for-service, αp, with 0 < α ≤ 1,13 and non-billable services, denoted SNB, are not remunerated:
α = 0.14
Billable services must be further differentiated by whether or not they were performed while
the physician was on the per diem. This is due to the fact that physicians working under MR do
not necessarily spend all of their time under the per diem. Clinical services provided outside a per
diem period are remunerated according to the same rate as for FFS physicians, p. We denote billable
services that were performed outside of the per diem by SBFFS. Those performed under the per diem
are denoted SBMR. Non-billable services, performed under per diem periods are not paid and hence
not recorded, which raises econometric issues discussed later.
To calculate annual income under MR, let N denote the average number of per diems claimed
per week throughout the year, andW , the number of weeks worked during the year. Gross income
under the MR system is then given by
X̂MR =WND + αpSBMR + p(SBFFS + SNBFFS). (12)
The earnings derived from practice is thus given by15
X̂ = DX̂MR + (1− D)X̂FFS. (13)
Table 1 provides a summary description of the compensation system that applies to specialist
physicians in Quebec.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our data contains information on the labour supply behaviour and individual characteristics of
physicians practicing in Quebec between 1996 and 2002. These data come from two sources. The
first source of data is the time-survey conducted annually by the College of Physicians of Quebec.
This survey provides information on the average number of hours per week spent seeing patients as
13The value of α is speciality and service specific. Its average over all billable services in our sample is approximately
0.3.
14The MR system is not applicable to work performed in private clinics; services provided in such clinics are generally
billed on a FFS basis.
15Disposable income of physicians differs from (13) due to two factors. First, the government imposes income ceilings
on physicians, beyond which the price paid for each service is reduced by 75%. Second, there is a regionally differentiated
remuneration rate, designed to induce physicians to practice in remote areas of the province. These two points are taken
into account in our econometric analysis.
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Table 1: Remuneration of Quebec Physicians included in the sample
FFS MR
No fixed remuneration - Earned for each 3.5 hours of work in hospital
Administrative/teaching activities Half per diem: - All kinds of practice eligible
uncompensated - Limited to 28 every two weeks of work
Billable - Compensated at price αp during per diem hours
Clinical Services Services : - Compensated at price p outside per diem hours
compensated
at price p Non-billable - Uncompensated during per diem hours
Services : - Compensated at price p outside per diem hours
Differentiated remuneration based upon individual characteristics
Ceilinga
aExcept for emergency activities until 2001, and the whole hospital activities since 2001.
Note. The first two rows describe the way hours of work (first row) and services (second row) are remunerated under Fee-for-Service
(left-hand side) and Mixed Remuneration (right-hand side). The last two rows describe some income policies that equally apply to both
compensation schemes.
well as hours spent performing teaching and administrative duties. Since the MR reform occurred
in the last quarter of 1999, we eliminated 1999 and 2000 from our empirical analysis, as these years
correspond to a period of transition to the reform. Incorporating these data would introduce more
dynamic complications to the model without any clear cut benefits to the estimation of the response
of physicians to incentives. Also, we assume that annual weeks worked are exogenous and set at
its average over the period (= 45) for each individual. Including the choice of the number of weeks
worked in our model would have introduced an unnecessary complication. Preliminary results on
this variable indicate that there is almost no variation in the data, no effect on the estimates, and the
elasticities are tiny (Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer, 2010). Moreover, this allows us to include 2001
in our sample, a year for which the time-survey does not provide information on weeks worked.
The survey also includes information on the personal characteristics of each physician, including
age, gender, and specialization.
The second source of data is the Health Insurance Organization of Quebec (the RAMQ). This
is a public-sector organization, responsible for paying physicians in the province. It therefore has
administrative records containing information on the income and billing practices of each physician
working in the province. Data on income and the number of services provided are available on a
quarterly basis for every physician working in the province. Data from these two sources have been
anonymously matched on the basis of physician billing numbers.
Typically, each physician provides a variety of different services, each remunerated at different
rates. These rates reflect differing input requirements in terms of the physician’s time and service
intensity. To keep our estimation problem tractable, we aggregated these different services to form a
quantity index of services provided, distinguishing only between billable and non-billable services.
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We weighted the different types of services by the fee received for that service. This provides a
control for the difficulty in providing the service.
Price variation is excluded from the index by holding price weights constant at the base year
levels.16 These weights are the base-year prices paid to FFS physicians; they are the same for both
billable and non-billable services.17 The price data for different services was also aggregated into
indexes for billable and non-billable services, under FFS and MR. The price index for services pro-
vided under FFS, denoted p, was calculated as a Laspeyres price index. The average number of
each type of service provided in the base year served as the weight for the price of that service.
The index for services provided under MR, denoted αp, was similarly calculated by aggregating
the fees paid for individual services under MR. Here we also used the average quantities of each
service provided among FFS in the base year as weights. In this way, the MR price index excludes
quantity variations due to MR switching. The precise calculations underlying all indexes are given
in the Appendix A.1.
The empirical model that we estimate is numerically intensive, involving multidimensional in-
tegrals. In order to limit computational time we restricted the sample to one specialty: pediatrics.
This specialty provides high variability in the participation in MR (58% of pediatricians opted for
MR in the year 2001) and in the marginal incentives to perform services.18 Focusing on one special-
ity also reduces the problem of heterogeneity in the nature of services provided. Summary statistics
for the sample period are provided in Table 2. We divide the sample into Before MR Reform (1996
to 1998) and After MR Reform (2001-2002) and on the basis of physicians who remain under FFS
or switch to MR (the panel is unbalanced due to flows in and out of the population of physicians
over the period). A physician is considered to have switched to MR if he is paid (at least in part)
under the MR system during the sample period. Note that patients are not informed about the
compensation scheme that applies to the physician they see. Moreover, waiting lists were very long
in Quebec during the sample period. As a result, it is unlikely that the changes in practice patterns
that are observed upon the adoption of MR are due to changes in the patient mix that physicians
face.
The top part of the table provides information on the professional practice behaviour of the
physicians in our sample, disaggregated into the four categories considered. We focus on weekly
hours of work (defined as the self-declared time spent in hospital), both in clinical medicine (provid-
ing services to patients, defined as clinical hours, hc) and other activities (defined as the time spent
working in hospital without seeing patients, like doing administration and teaching, and defined
as non-clinical hours, ho),19 clinical services provided (both billable and non-billable), measured in
16To account for new services and services that become obsolete, we used two base years, producing a Linked
Laspeyres index.
17This ensures that the difficulty weight applied to each service is independent of the manner in which the physician
is paid.
18Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) provides an extensive summary of MR across specialties.
19Note that administration covers the time physicians need to spend on following-up on patients treatment (updating
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Table 2: Summary statistics on sampled physicians
FFS physicians MR physicians
Before After Before After
Observed practice
Weekly Total Hours 43.09 41.92 48.64 46.73
[13.01] [12.83] [12.67] [10.62]
clinical (hc) 38.69 38.85 41.38 39.02
[12.79] [11.62] [13.73] [12.62]
non clinical (ho) 4.40 3.07 7.26 7.71
[8.36] [8.20] [9.62] [10.33]
Total Servicesa 167.00 167.94 141.81 122.19
[66.83] [72.88] [56.16] [72.24]
Non-billableb (SNB) 71.85 73.22 60.94 55.19
[47.02] [57.50] [36.20] [46.62]
Billable (SB) 95.15 96.73 80.88 67.00
[55.47] [57.44] [49.21] [46.07]
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
106.68 99.21 82.79 69.77
[112.99] [42.24] [38.79] [37.97]
Annual incomea (X) 167.84 191.71 146.41 191.66
[67.35] [79.64] [56.86] [61.85]
Sample characteristics
Number of physicians 139 123 111 99
Number of observations 355 206 267 175
Gender (Male = 1] 0.66 0.65 0.52 0.55
[0.47] [0.48] [0.50] [0.50]
Age 49.89 52.70 43.07 47.26
[11.17] [11.04] [10.04] [10.03]
aIn thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
bLower bound for MR physicians after the reform. See below, Section 5.4.
Note. The upper part provides the average practice behavior of Quebec pediatricians included in our sample, split according to their
choice of compensation scheme—FFS physicians are those who never adopt MR during the observation period, MR physicians are those
who switch to MR—and the time period—before (1996-1998) and after (2001-2002) the reform. The bottom part of the Table summarizes
individual characteristics. Standard errors appear in brackets.
thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars, service intensity (total clinical services per clinical worked hour),
and annual income. We present the average and standard deviation of each variable. The bottom
part of the table presents summary statistics on the demographic characteristics of physicians in
each of the different categories.
These statistics on professional practice suggest both changes in behaviour subsequent to the
introduction of MR (incentive effects), and the selection of physicians into contracts. Changes in
the patient record, heading a department, etc.). This does not include hospital administration like actually billing the
patients, which falls under the responsibility of the hospital staff.
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behaviour are evident from the Before and After columns among the MR physicians.20 The average
volume of services supplied by MR physicians decreased after switching to MR from 141.81 to
122.19. This change, in the order of 13.8%, is suggestive of a substantial reaction to incentives
among those treated by the reform. Notice that this is composed of changes in both billable and
non-billable services. The table shows that the supply of both types of services decreased after
the introduction of the reform, although one must bear in mind that non-billable services are only
partially observed after the reform.21 There is a 17% decrease in billable services, from 80.88 to 67.
This is a similar order of magnitude to the treatment effect (on the treated) among pediatricians
calculated by Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) among pediatricians (12.81%) using
difference-in-difference techniques.
Other behavioural changes are also suggested by the table. MR physicians sharply decreased
their service intensity from 82.79 to 69.77, a decrease of 15.7%. This decrease in services performed
per hour is largely due to the change in services provided—weekly clinical hours worked changes
relatively little with the reform (from 41.38 to 39.02, a decrease in the order of 5%). The increase
in income among the FFS physicians that is observed after the introduction of MR is due to the
government increasing the fees paid per service.22 MR physicians’ earnings increased much more
(in percentage) than those of FSS physicians (31% vs 14%). This suggests that the introduction of
the per diem offset any loss of earnings due to a reduction of services provided and hours worked.
Table 2 also points to potentially important selection effects on observables and/or inobserv-
ables in the data. There are notable differences in terms of clinical and non clinical weekly hours of
work. Before the reform, MR physicians provided 7% more clinical hours and 65% more non clinical
hours of work than FFS physicians. This latter result may be related to the endogenous decision to
switch to MR, the non clinical hours being compensated under MR (by the per diem) but not under
FFS. There is also evidence that physicians who eventually switched to MR were, on average, low
“service intensity” physicians. MR physicians provided 15% fewer total services before the reform
than FFS physicians. The difference in services leads to a substantial difference in annual income,
pre-reform; MR physicians earned approximately 13% less income.
One important part of the explanation for these results is likely to be selection on observables
(in particular, gender and age). Table 2 shows that before reform, 66% of FFS physicians were male,
while only 52% of MR physicians were male. This indicates that the proportion of females who
switched to MR (59%) is larger than that of males (38.6%). This is perhaps unsurprising since the
female physicians work fewer hours and provide fewer services than do the male physicians in
our sample. Thus female physicians had more incentive to adhere to the MR system. Also, before
20As the FFS physicians did not change compensation systems, it is to be expected that there is little variation in their
behaviour after the reform.
21Recall, non-billable services are only paid under RM if they are performed outside of hospital. Therefore, part of
the observed reduction is mechanical. The fact that the decrease in volume is relatively small, in spite of this, probably
reflects the small payments that physicians receive for these, relatively minor, services.
22The reaction of FFS physicians to this increase is studied extensively in Some (2016).
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reform, MR physicians are younger (43 years on average) than physicians who remained under FFS
(50 years on average). This may partly be explained by the presence of preference habits that are
likely to be stronger for older physicians.
While Table 2 provides a number of interesting statistics, more sophisticated econometric ap-
proaches are needed to address the selection issue. In particular, introducing unobserved hetero-
geneity in the model allows us to account for the selection on unobservables as well as to control for
exogenous observable variables. Also, structural approaches are required to perform counterfactual
reforms and ex-ante prediction. Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) provide an empir-
ical analysis of this reform via a difference-in-difference approach (see their Table 6). Their results
are quite close to those in Table 2 and correspond to Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATT).
Such unrestricted methods allow for the evaluation of the impact of the observed reform. However,
ex-ante prediction seeks to predict the impact of, as yet, unobserved reforms. It requires the recov-
ery of preference parameters to predict how physicians will react under alternative compensation
systems.
5 Empirical Model
We now turn to developing our empirical model, adapting the theoretical model outlined in section
2 to the institutional details of the Quebec reform. We work with annual data and hence, specify
preferences as a function of annual consumption, leisure and services, consistent with (5). We allow
for two types of services: billable, denoted SB, and non-billable, denoted SNB. Recall that billable
services are remunerated under both FFS and MR while non-billable services are remunerated only
under FFS. Non-billable services will be supplied under MR if, for example, physicians gain utility
from patient health (Arrow, 1963; Evans, 1974), or if such services are complements (or an input) in
the production of billable services.23 We allow for this possibility in estimating the model, treating
the level of non-billable services observed under MR as a lower bound to the actual level supplied.
To account for the supply of time to administrative and teaching services under FFS, when they
are not remunerated, we assume that they yield non-pecuniary benefits. For example, performing
teaching tasks may increase influence and prestige.24 To capture this in a simple and direct manner,
we allow for two types of work in our model: clinical work, denoted by hc, and non-clinical work,
denoted by ho, capturing time per week spent in administrative and teaching duties. We denote the
total weekly hours by ht (with ht = hc + ho). Pure leisure is denoted by l.
23Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008) provide the theoretical analysis of a model of physician behaviour in which
utility depends on practice through the health produced, as the result of ethical concerns.
24An alternative would be to assume that these activities are complementary to billable services.
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Physicians’ preferences are represented by an annual utility function,25
u = u(X, ho, l, SB, SNB) (14)
defined over:
X (Annual income),
ho (Weekly hours of administrative work and teaching)
l (Weekly hours of leisure outside of work),
SB (Number of billable services supplied throughout the year),
SNB (Number of non-billable services supplied throughout the year).
The weekly time constraint is given by:
l = T − hc − ho,
where T = 24× 7 = 168, the maximum amount of time available in a week. We also allow for
differences in the marginal utility (or disutility) of billable and non-billable services.26 The efficient
budget constraint is obtained from the compensation system that maximizes net income, X, for each
practice vector.
5.1 Discrete Alternatives
Given the non linearities in the efficient budget constraint after the MR reform, we follow the stan-
dard tradition in the empirical labour supply literature (van Soest, 1995; Hoynes, 1996) and dis-
cretize the physicians’ choice set. For each variable describing the practice patterns of physicians,
we consider a finite number of possible alternatives among which each physician can choose. We al-
low for Nc = 4 levels of clinical hours of work, No = 4 levels of non-clinical hours of work, NSB = 5
levels of billable services, and NSNB = 5 levels of non-billable services. The complete choice set of
practice variables involves dim(J) = Nc × No × NSB × NSNB = 400 alternatives. A single alternative,
corresponding to one particular practice possibility, is a set of values: j =
{
cj, oj, SBj , S
NB
j
}
respec-
tively pointing to the cjth level of discretized clinical hours of work, cj ∈ {1, ..., Nc}, the ojth level of
discretized non-clinical hours of work, etc. The consumption under each alternative is computed
through the efficient budget constraint, along which the physician maximizes utility.
25Recall that the number of weeks worked is set at 45 and therefore the number of weeks of leisure is equal to 6 in the
utility function.
26This allows for the possibility that different types of services may be associated with different levels of difficulty and
require different service intensity levels to complete the task. For example, an important element of non-billable services
consists of follow-up visits by the physician, which check the progress of a patient after a particular treatment.
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5.2 Choice Probabilities and the Utility Function
Let Vij stand for the annual utility of physician i in alternative j. A standard assumption (McFadden,
1974) is to account for alternative-specific measurement errors on utility by decomposing Vij into a
deterministic component, uj, and a random term which is independent across alternatives εij. Thus,
Vij = uj + εij, where εij ∼ i.i.d. Gumbel (extreme value type I).
Note that the random part of utility cannot be interpreted as reflecting unobservable heterogeneity
since it is independent across alternatives; individual heterogeneity will be added in Section 5.4.1
below.
We specify utility as a quadratic function, which constitutes a second order approximation of
any well-behaved utility function. While the approximation is not necessarily quasi-concave ev-
erywhere in its domain, this does not affect our empirical application; discretizing the choice set
allows us to estimate the model without imposing quasi-concavity (van Soest, 1995). Appendix
A.5 provides a step-by-step description of our econometric approach. Note finally that the discrete
approach to estimating labour supply models requires the marginal utility of consumption to be
positive at all chosen points along the budget constraint (van Soest, 1995). The quadratic utility
function does not impose this condition. We will therefore check whether the latter is satisfied at
the optimum for each individual and each period in our sample.
5.3 Identification
By influencing budget (but not preferences) parameters associated with various alternatives, the
introduction of the MR reform helps identification. Thus, factors such as 1) the piece-rate difference
between real billable FSS and billable MR services, 2) the piece-rate difference between real FSS and
real (non-billable in MR) services, 3) the per diem difference between FFS and MR, affect the real
monetary rewards associated with a number of alternatives. In a sense, our approach is similar to
Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998) who exploited tax reforms over time to identify a structural
labour supply model. Changes over time in real income ceilings and in the consumer price index
(for given levels of nominal piece-rates and other FFS parameters) also help parameter identifica-
tion. Moreover, the structure of our model (our optimization approach, the introduction of both
observed and unobserved heterogeneity, the functional form of the utility function, and the statistic
distributions used) are all factors which make identification easier.27
While we do not formally prove that our model is identified, a simple (admittedly heuristic)
identification demonstration is based on the proposition that, under weak regularity conditions, a
parametric model is (locally) identified at a given vector θ if and only if the information matrix is
non-singular at this point (Rothenberg, 1971). For each specification of our model (except a few
27An alternative identification strategy would be to use instruments that are correlated with the decision to participant
in MR, but independent of preferences. Data limitation preclude us from applying these methods.
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cases discussed later), the estimator that maximizes the likelihood function strongly converged to-
wards the same parameter vector and gave rise to a non-singular estimated covariance matrix (the
inverse of the information matrix). This suggests that our model is not only locally but globally
identified.
5.4 Estimation issues
Several features of our data set necessitate modifications to the standard estimation methodology
and likelihood function. First, since every combination of the discretized practice variables has to be
considered as an alternative, the model allows for choices that contradict the technical constraint a
physician faces. For example, a physician could theoretically choose to provide the highest available
level of services while exerting zero hours of clinical work. Obviously such an alternative is not
observed in our sample. For estimation purposes, we exclude those alternatives that are impossible
in practice and, in concrete terms, never observed. We then estimate the model by reducing the
choice set to the alternatives actually chosen in the sample: JC ⊂ J, where dim(JC) = 314. Note that
this strategy leads us to use the same alternatives for estimation independent of the alternative that
was chosen.
To account for the partial observability of non-billable services under MR, we integrate over all
possible actual services that could have generated a given level of observed services. Let SNBm denote
the level of non-billable services that is observed for a given physician (i.e. and delivered outside
the per diem period). Since, for this observation, SNBm is a lower bound to the actual number of non-
billable services provided, we observe SNBm whenever SNB ∈
{
SNBm , SNBm+1, S
NB
m+2, . . . , S
NB
NSNB
}
. What is
more, since the different levels of non-billable services are mutually exclusive, the individual contri-
bution to likelihood for an MR physician that chose the observable zj, SNBm is obtained by summing
over SNBl l ≥ m; i.e.,
P
(
zj, SNBm
)
=
exp(γ′zj + z′jβzj)
JC
∑
k=1
exp(uk)
NSNB
∑
l=m
exp(γSNB SNBl + b
′
A.zjS
NB
l + βSNB (S
NB
l )
2). (15)
The traditional Logit probabilities are thus corrected for the uncertainty about the chosen al-
ternative inside the chosen subset. The contribution to the likelihood of individual i is then given
by
Lij =
 exp(uj)JC
∑
k=1
exp(uk)

1−Di [
P
(
zj, SNBm
)]Di
, (16)
where Di indicates whether a physician worked under MR (Di = 1) or FFS (Di = 0).
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5.4.1 Heterogeneity in Preferences
We account for observable heterogeneity in preferences and productivity in the model, allowing
the estimated coefficients of the utility function presented in (37) in Section A.5.1 to depend on
individual characteristics. In particular, we allow the linear coefficient terms, γ, and the quadratic
coefficient terms, β, to be linear functions of age and gender
γki = γ
k
0 + γ
k
1 × Agei + γk2 × DMalei k = {o, l, L, SB, SNB, X} , (17)
βki = β
k
0 + β
k
1 × Agei + βk2 × DMalei k = {o, l, L, SB, SNB, X} , (18)
where DMale is a dummy variable indicating male physicians.
We account for unobservable heterogeneity by adding normally distributed random terms to
the functions in (17). Define
γ̃i = (γ̃
o
i , γ̃
l
i , γ̃
B
i , γ̃
X
i )
to be the vector of random coefficients, where
γ̃k
′
i = γ
k′
0 + γ
k′
1 × Agei + γk
′
2 × DMalei + ηk
′
i k
′ = o, l, SB, X.
We assume that ηk
′
i ∼ N(0, σk′) and that the η’s are mutually independent, and independent of
εj, ∀j. Conditional on the γ̃i’s, the contributions to the likelihood are given by
lij(γ̃i, βi) =
 exp(uij)JC
∑
k=1
exp(uik)

1−Di [
Pij
(
zj, SNBm
)]Di , (19)
where the utility index now depends on i to incorporate both observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity. The unconditional probabilities correspond to the mixed logit specification. One potentially im-
portant advantage of the latter is that it does not impose the independence of irrelevant alternative
(IIA) condition as does the standard multinomial logit.
The estimation of this model requires the computation of a large number of four-dimensional
integrals. To calculate these integrals we rely on simulated Maximum Likelihood estimator. The es-
timator derived from this specification is asymptotically equivalent to an exact ML estimator given
that
√
r, where r is the number of draws, rises faster than the size of the sample (Gourieroux and
Monfort, 1993).28 The panel dimension of our data is taken into account by allowing for repeated
choices by each physician. In this context the random draws generating individual heterogeneity
are constant across time for a given physician, but vary across physicians. The errors, εij, are iid.
28The draws were generated using Halton sequences that produces lower simulation variance for given r (Train, 1999).
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5.4.2 Calculating income
We identify the utility-function parameters by restricting the observed decisions to be optimal
choices. This requires calculating the utility associated with each alternative available to a physi-
cian; i.e., each j ∈ J. Since each physician is only observed in one state in a given period, and since
different states imply different income levels, estimation requires calculating the counterfactual in-
come levels for each of the unobserved states. To do so, we rely on our discussion of the budget
constraint presented in Section 3. In particular we use equations (11) to (13) to predict the income
for each alternative. Recall that the only level of income we observe is the one earned by each
physician in his/her chosen alternative, under his/her current compensation scheme.
Recall from our discussion in Section 3, we aggregated services provided into two types: billable,
denoted SB, and non-billable, denoted SNB. Under FFS, both types of services are paid at the same
aggregate price, denoted pt. Consumption in alternative j, in year t, under FFS is then given by
XFFSj,t = pt(S
B
j + S
NB
j ). (20)
Calculating consumption under MR based on (12) is somewhat more complex, since payment
for services depends on whether the service is provided under the per diem or not (recall that billable
services provided under the per diem were paid a lower fee, αp). Appendix A.5.2 provides full details
about how we account for these issues.
5.4.3 Constrained Choice
Recall that the actual choice of a compensation system was not individual specific. Rather, members
of specialist departments within each hospital determined the compensation system by vote, only
adopting the MR system if the vote was unanimously in favour. This raises the possibility that some
physicians may be constrained in their choice of a compensation system and, hence, not be located
on the efficient budget constraint.29 However only those physicians who prefer MR are potentially
constrained; those who prefer FFS are ensured their unconstrained choice since the voting rule
is unanimous. This implies that physicians who are observed on sections of the efficient budget
constraint under MR are not constrained. Physicians observed under FFS can be divided into two
groups: those who are observed in an alternative j for which XMRj > X
FFS
j are constrained. Those
who select alternatives for which XMRj < X
FFS
j are potentially constrained.
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To account for constraints on choices, let ψ denote the probability that a physician is constrained
from attaining the efficient budget constraint.31 We then define the following observed regimes:
29We do see a number of physicians (30 in 2002) who are paid FFS contracts when they would earn higher income
under MR, for the same practice variables.
30The unanimity rule applies to movement back from MR to FSS. However, in practice, no department switched from
MR to FFS in our sample.
31An alternative approach to modelling the choice restriction would directly introduce the work contract into the utility
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R1 the physician is observed FFS when only FFS is available (i.e., pre-reform observations);
R2 the physician is observed MR when MR dominates;
R3 the physician is observed FFS when MR dominates;
R4 the physician is observed FFS when FFS dominates.
We disregard the case of physicians observed MR while FFS dominates which is ruled out by as-
sumption.32
Let Dij indicate the presence of physician i in regime Rj, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A constrained physi-
cian selects his optimal labour supply alternative along the FFS budget constraint rather than the
efficient budget constraint denoted E f f . We therefore redefine utility to account for the relevant
budget constraint. Let uBij denote the utility derived by physician i from alternative j when income
is computed under budget constraint B ∈ {FFS, E f f } and let
PB
(
zj, SNBm
)
(21)
denote the probability of observing a given alternative
(
zj, SNBm
)
for an MR physician, from (15). The
individual contribution to the likelihood function is given by
li(γ̃i, βi) =
[
exp(uFFSij )
∑k∈J exp(uFFSik )
]Di1
×
[
(1− ψ) PE f f
(
zj, SNBm
)]Di2
×
[
ψ
exp(uFFSij )
∑k∈J exp(uFFSik )
]Di3
×
ψ exp(uFFSij )
∑k∈J exp(uFFSik )
+ (1− ψ)
exp(uE f fij )
∑k∈J exp(u
E f f
ik )
(1−D1i−D2i−D3i) .
(22)
function so that choices provide the different utility depending on whether they are completed under MR or FFS. One
problem with this approach is that it multiplies by two the number of alternatives. More importantly, it is ad hoc as it
does not take into account the nature of the institutional constraint.
32There are only 10 observations that fall into this category; they are classified in R2. One interpretation of this case
is that these physicians make optimization errors. These regimes only apply to observations post-reform, which are
restricted to 2002 observations in our sample. To ease exposition, we thus restrict here to contributions to the likelihood
of 2002 observations (i.e., conditional on the contribution of the same physician in all years before), and ignore the
dependency on time in the notation.
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The likelihood function reflects the fact that the constraints on behaviour only apply to regimes
R2—R4 sinceR1 occurs before the reform. Physicians in regimeR2 are unconstrained which occurs
with probability (1−ψ). The physicians in regimeR3 are constrained which occurs with probability
ψ. The physicians in regime R4 can be either constrained or unconstrained.33The main source of
empirical identification of this probability thus is the share of physicians whose utility maximizing
alternative is paid MR while they are observed in a FFS one.
6 Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates
We estimated three versions of the quadratic utility function: first, with observed heterogeneity (i.e.,
with age and gender); second, with observed and unobserved heterogeneity (a random term being
added to all the linear terms of the parameters, γk), and third, with observed heterogeneity on all
parameters, but unobserved heterogeneity restricted to a subset of the linear parameters. Each case
incorporates constrained choice of the compensation system—the contribution to the likelihood of
observation i, conditional on γ̃i, is given by (22).34 The results are presented in Table 3.
The first column presents results when observed heterogeneity is introduced into the linear
and quadratic terms for non-clinical hours worked per week (ho), hours of leisure per week (l),
non-billable services (SNB), billable services (SB) and income (X). These coefficients are permitted
to vary with age and gender. The second column introduces unobserved heterogeneity. In this
specification, a random term is added to the parameters on the linear terms (in addition to being
functions of age and gender). The standard error of this error term is reported accordingly. Finally,
the third column is the same as the second one but in which we parsimoniously assume that some
linear parameters are not random.
Recall that the discrete approach to estimating labour supply models requires the marginal util-
ity of consumption to be positive at all chosen points along the budget constraint. This requirement
is satisfied for 76% of observations in the model with observed heterogeneity. It is satisfied for 57%
of the observations in the model with both observed and unobserved heterogeneity on all linear pa-
rameters. After experimentation, we found that a higher percentage (= 83%) is reached by a model
in which unobserved heterogeneity is restricted to the linear parameters of non-clinical hours (ho),
leisure (l), and billable services (SB). In the interests of selecting a model that best fits the data, while
respecting theoretical restrictions, we concentrate on this last version.
33The probability of being constrained is fixed and does not depend on observable variables such as age and gender.
This assumption has been made for parsimony, but also reflects the fact that preliminary results showed that the estimated
coefficients of these variables were not significant.
34We also estimated the model without taking account of constrained choice. The results for these specifications were
generally less satisfactory than those presented. However, we used these results to simulate the impact of making MR
system individual rather than group free (see section 6.3).
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6.2 Preference parameters
Note that we choose this specification in spite of the fact that the likelihood function increased sub-
stantially (from -4386 to -4290) upon assuming that all linear parameters are random (version 2).
This reflects the tradeoff between fitting the sample data and estimating economic models. Our se-
lection criteria is in the spirit of a more general strategy of selecting the best fitting model among the
set of models for which the theoretical restrictions are not rejected. Moreover, as a robustness check,
we performed the simulation of the treatment effects using the latter, full specification. The results
are very similar to those we present here.35 Interestingly, whatever the specification considered,
the probability, ψ, that a physician is constrained from attaining the efficient budget constraint is
very high (=0.46 in all specifications) and highly significant. This suggests that introducing a reform
allowing physicians to choose their compensation system individually may have a strong effect on
their behaviour. We will return to these issues in section 6.3.3.
Table 4 compares the predictions with observed choices for the year 2002 (the last post-reform
year in our sample). The middle column of the table gives the average predicted value of the differ-
ent choice variables of the model. The last column gives the average observed values of these same
variables. On the whole, the model’s fit is very good. The average (combined) hours worked per
week, average clinical hours worked, average number of billable services, average service intensity
(time spent per clinical service), and average income are all matched very closely by the model’s
predictions. The model has more trouble matching the number of non-clinical hours worked.36
6.3 Policy simulations
Estimation of a structural model allows us to simulate the impact of different compensation policies
on physician behaviour. Different compensation policies imply different budget constraints, which
in turn affect the probabilities of selecting different practice alternatives. Given knowledge of the
preference parameters we simply calculate the (expected) predicted behaviour on the basis of the
revised budget constraint. We compute bootstrapped standard errors of this predicted behavior,
obtained by repeated random draws of the model parameters from their estimated distributions
and by recalculating predicted behavior for each draw.
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Table 3: Preference Parameters
Homogenous Mixed Logit: Mixed Logit: preferred specification
MNL on linear terms All physicians MR physicians FFS physicians
Coef. (St.d.) Coef. (St.d.) Coef. (St.d.) Coef. (St.d.) Coef. (St.d.)
γo 3.65e-01∗∗∗ (0.071) 7.78e-01∗∗∗ (0.140) 8.25e-01∗∗∗ (0.157) 8.17e-01∗∗∗ (0.139) 8.32e-01∗∗∗ (0.135)
σo — — 1.40e-01∗∗∗ (0.035) 1.50e-01∗∗∗ (0.023) 1.50e-01∗∗∗ (0.025) 1.50e-01∗∗∗ (0.026)
γo ×Male — — 2.40e-01∗∗∗ (0.056) 2.21e-01∗∗∗ (0.056) 2.21e-01∗∗∗ (0.055) 2.21e-01∗∗∗ (0.054)
γo × Age — — -8.58e-02∗∗∗ (0.028) -7.82e-02∗∗∗ (0.027) -7.82e-02∗∗∗ (0.028) -7.82e-02∗∗∗ (0.023)
γl 6.87e-01∗∗∗ (0.067) 8.57e-01∗∗∗ (0.228) 1.09e+00∗∗∗ (0.258) 1.09e+00∗∗∗ (0.262) 1.08e+00∗∗∗ (0.272)
σl — — 9.33e-02∗∗∗ (0.016) 1.06e-01∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.06e-01∗∗∗ (0.015) 1.06e-01∗∗∗ (0.016)
γl ×Male — — 1.25e-02 (0.123) -2.06e-02 (0.121) -2.06e-02 (0.121) -2.06e-02 (0.129)
γl × Age — — 7.33e-02∗ (0.046) 4.91e-02 (0.052) 4.91e-02 (0.054) 4.91e-02 (0.056)
γS
NB
4.00e-02∗∗∗ (0.014) 1.31e-02 (0.039) 5.77e-02∗∗ (0.025) 5.77e-02∗∗∗ (0.019) 5.77e-02∗∗∗ (0.022)
γS
NB ×Male — — 1.76e-02 (0.015) 1.36e-02 (0.011) 1.36e-02 (0.011) 1.36e-02 (0.011)
γS
NB × Age — — 3.92e-03 (0.009) -2.81e-03 (0.004) -2.81e-03 (0.003) -2.81e-03 (0.003)
γS
B
6.59e-02∗∗∗ (0.014) 6.19e-02∗ (0.039) 1.88e-01∗∗∗ (0.021) 1.89e-01∗∗∗ (0.026) 1.82e-01∗∗∗ (0.039)
σS
B
— — 8.35e-02∗∗∗ (0.010) 9.33e-02∗∗∗ (0.011) 9.33e-02∗∗∗ (0.011) 9.33e-02∗∗∗ (0.013)
γS
B ×Male — — 5.20e-03 (0.025) 2.53e-02 (0.026) 2.53e-02 (0.024) 2.53e-02 (0.023)
γS
B × Age — — 1.84e-02∗∗∗ (0.006) 3.14e-03 (0.005) 3.14e-03 (0.007) 3.14e-03 (0.005)
γx 4.40e-02∗∗∗ (0.012) 1.65e-01∗∗∗ (0.048) 3.88e-02∗∗∗ (0.012) 3.88e-02∗∗∗ (0.014) 3.88e-02∗∗∗ (0.013)
σx — — 3.58e-02∗∗∗ (0.005) — — — — — —
γx ×Male — — -6.46e-03 (0.019) -2.46e-03 (0.014) -2.46e-03 (0.013) -2.46e-03 (0.014)
γx × Age — — -1.18e-02 (0.010) — — — — — —
βol -2.87e-03
∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.37e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.92e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.92e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.92e-03∗∗∗ (0.001)
βoSNB 8.13e-05 (0.000) -2.04e-04 (0.000) -8.13e-05 (0.000) -8.13e-05 (0.000) -8.13e-05 (0.000)
βoSB -8.72e-04
∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.48e-03∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.60e-03∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.60e-03∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.60e-03∗∗∗ (0.000)
βox -1.38e-04 (0.000) 5.98e-05 (0.000) -8.57e-05 (0.000) -8.57e-05 (0.000) -8.57e-05 (0.000)
βlSNB -2.27e-04
∗∗ (0.000) -1.70e-04 (0.000) -4.03e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -4.03e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -4.03e-04∗∗∗ (0.000)
βlSB -2.83e-04
∗∗∗ (0.000) -3.99e-04∗∗ (0.000) -7.27e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -7.27e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -7.27e-04∗∗∗ (0.000)
βlx -1.95e-04∗∗ (0.000) -3.55e-04∗∗ (0.000) — — — — — —
βS
NB
SB 1.07e-04
∗∗∗ (0.000) 3.20e-05 (0.000) 4.59e-05 (0.000) 4.59e-05 (0.000) 4.59e-05 (0.000)
βS
NB
x -1.24e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) 1.03e-06 (0.000) — — — — — —
βS
B
x -7.19e-05∗∗∗ (0.000) 9.74e-05∗ (0.000) — — — — — —
βo -6.96e-04 (0.001) -1.29e-02∗∗∗ (0.004) -1.13e-02∗∗∗ (0.004) -1.13e-02∗∗∗ (0.004) -1.13e-02∗∗∗ (0.003)
βo ×Male — — -4.64e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.94e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.94e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -3.94e-03∗∗∗ (0.001)
βo × Age — — 2.32e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) 1.85e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) 1.85e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) 1.85e-03∗∗∗ (0.001)
βl -2.47e-03∗∗∗ (0.000) -3.36e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -4.26e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -4.26e-03∗∗∗ (0.001) -4.26e-03∗∗∗ (0.001)
βl ×Male — — 3.16e-05 (0.001) 1.63e-04 (0.000) 1.63e-04 (0.001) 1.63e-04 (0.001)
βl × Age — — -2.51e-04∗ (0.000) -1.60e-04 (0.000) -1.60e-04 (0.000) -1.60e-04 (0.000)
βS
NB
-3.15e-05∗ (0.000) -1.50e-04 (0.000) -1.43e-04∗ (0.000) -1.43e-04∗∗ (0.000) -1.43e-04∗∗ (0.000)
βS
NB ×Male — — 3.90e-06 (0.000) -2.82e-05 (0.000) -2.82e-05 (0.000) -2.82e-05 (0.000)
βS
NB × Age — — -7.40e-06 (0.000) 1.53e-05 (0.000) 1.53e-05 (0.000) 1.53e-05 (0.000)
βS
B
-1.25e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -3.42e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -5.79e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -5.79e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -5.79e-04∗∗∗ (0.000)
βS
B ×Male — — 1.69e-04 (0.000) 1.87e-04∗ (0.000) 1.87e-04∗∗ (0.000) 1.87e-04∗∗ (0.000)
βS
B × Age — — -9.88e-05∗∗∗ (0.000) -6.17e-05∗∗ (0.000) -6.17e-05 (0.000) -6.17e-05∗∗∗ (0.000)
βx — — -3.14e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.06e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.06e-04∗∗∗ (0.000) -1.06e-04∗∗∗ (0.000)
βx ×Male — — 2.47e-05 (0.000) 2.21e-05 (0.000) 2.21e-05 (0.000) 2.21e-05 (0.000)
βx × Age — — 1.51e-05 (0.000) — — — — — —
ψ 4.58e-01∗∗∗ (0.067) 4.55e-01∗∗∗ (0.066) 4.54e-01∗∗∗ (0.067) 4.54e-01∗∗∗ (0.067) 4.54e-01∗∗∗ (0.067)
LL -5098.1 -4290.2 -4385.6 -4390.26 –4386.86
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Table 4: Model Fit
Observed Predicted Observed
Total 2002 2002
Weekly Total Hours 44.77 45.93 43.88
clinical (hc) 39.50 39.70 38.78
non clinical (ho) 5.27 6.23 5.10
Total Servicesa 147.42 145.57 144.38
Non-billable (SNB) 64.27 61.61 63.59
Billable (SB) 83.15 83.96 80.78
Service Intensity
(
e = S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
82.93 81.49 82.74
Annual Incomea (X) 143.71 149.18 142.76
aThousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. The cells display the average practice behavior (in terms of practice variables) observed over the whole sample period (first
column) and in 2002 (last column). The second column reports the average practice behavior predicted by the model in 2002.
6.3.1 Elasticities through policy simulations
Table 5 provides results on elasticities of practice variables with respect to non-labour income,
hourly wage rate, and fee per service.37 The second column provides our benchmark; it is com-
puted as the average practice choice simulated from the estimated model against a simplified bud-
get constraint, broadly representative of the prevailing case before the reform. We assume an hourly
wage rate equal to $10, the full fee under FFS on all clinical services, and an exogenous non-labour
income equal to $10,000.38 We remove all the other parameters that may affect a physician’s bud-
get constraint (e.g., income ceilings and regionally differentiated remuneration). The physician’s
budget is thus linear in (w, p, y) with all arguments strictly positive. As the MR reform involved
substantial changes in the fee per service and wage parameters, for comparison sake, we also per-
formed our elasticity simulations based on large (50%) percentage changes in each of these param-
eters. Similarly, the computation of the income elasticity, εk/y, for each practice variable, k, is based
on the variation in practice induced by a 50% increase in non-labour income. Also, we use Slut-
sky decompositions of uncompensated elasticities into compensated and total income elasticities:
35In spite of the difference in fit, the simulated treatment effects from the two models are quite similar. For example,
under the observed reform, total services decrease by 6.5% (5.32%), weekly hours increase by and 0.34% and 0.24% and
services intensity decreases by 4.78% and 6.25% under the preferred model and full specification, respectively.
36Caution should be exercised in interpreting the statistics over non-billable services. Recall that the recorded volume
of non-billable services is a lower bound to the actual volume of services completed. We calculate the observed volume
as the recorded volume divided by the (estimated) probability that the physician provides additional services.
37The reader should bear in mind that an important difference between the elasticity simulations and the actual reform
is that, under the actual reform, the per diem (hourly wage) simultaneously becomes positive.
38We add small positive hourly wage and non-labour income to the observed FFS contract in order to allow us to
simulate elasticities at the benchmark.
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Table 5: Elasticity of practice variables
Ref. Non-labour income Hourly wage rate Service piece-rate
∆ y εk/y ∆ W εk/w ε̃k/w
whW
y εk/y ∆ IP εk/IP ε̃k/IP
PA
y εk/y
Weekly Total Hours 45.62 45.56 -0.003 45.63 0.000 0.053 -0.053 44.76 -0.038 0.052 -0.090
(1.06) (1.06) (0.0000) (1.06) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (1.07) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0013)
clinical (hc) 39.77 39.69 -0.004 39.77 -0.000 0.065 -0.065 38.87 -0.045 0.065 -0.110
(0.90) (0.89) (0.0000) (0.90) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.88) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0024)
non clinical (ho ) 5.86 5.86 0.002 5.86 0.000 -0.029 0.030 5.89 0.012 -0.039 0.051
(0.59) (0.58) (0.0002) (0.59) (0.0000) (0.0480) (0.0482) (0.66) (0.0230) (0.0513) (0.1420)
Total Servicesa 150.18 148.61 -0.021 150.11 -0.001 0.367 -0.368 131.07 -0.254 0.373 -0.627
(4.02) (4.04) (0.0000) (4.02) (0.0000) (0.0088) (0.0088) (5.95) (0.0047) (0.0124) (0.0258)
Non-billable (SNB ) 65.12 63.88 -0.038 65.06 -0.002 0.667 -0.669 50.69 -0.443 0.697 -1.140
(2.90) (2.90) (0.0001) (2.90) (0.0000) (0.0287) (0.0289) (4.62) (0.0126) (0.0437) (0.0841)
Billable (SB ) 85.06 84.72 -0.008 85.04 -0.000 0.137 -0.137 80.38 -0.110 0.124 -0.234
(2.99) (2.97) (0.0000) (2.99) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0014) (2.94) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0042)
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
75.53 74.88 -0.017 75.50 -0.001 0.303 -0.304 67.44 -0.214 0.303 -0.518
(1.50) (1.51) (0.0000) (1.50) (0.0000) (0.0061) (0.0061) (2.61) (0.0029) (0.0090) (0.0178)
Annual incomea (X) 142.36 145.20 0.040 142.49 0.002 -0.701 0.703 184.26 0.589 -0.610 1.199
(3.57) (3.59) (0.0000) (3.57) (0.0000) (0.0076) (0.0076) (7.80) (0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0216)
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Elasticities of practice variables simulated fromÂ estimated preferences. In the reference situation, physicians are paid the full fee under FFS on all clinical services, an hourly
wage rate equal to $10 and an exogenous non-labour income equal to $10,000. Elasticities are computed from a 50% change in each parameter of the resulting budget constraint—for
each parameter, the first column displays predicted average behaviour from the updated budget constraint. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parenthesis.
εk/w = ε̃k/w + whtWy εk/y and εk/p = ε̃k/p +
pS
y εk/y, and where W is set at 45 weeks of work, to
compute the wage and fee per service compensated elasticities of each practice variable.39
Results from the second panel of Table 5 indicate that physicians’ average clinical weekly hours
of work, and the volume of (billable and non-billable) services are negatively affected (with p <
0.01) by an increase in non-labour income. However, non-clinical hours of work increase with
non-labour income (with p < 0.01). This may partly be explained by the fact that this activity
yields important non-pecuniary benefits to the physician and that these benefits are normal goods.
Overall, the simulated elasticities are modest (in absolute value) though, ranging between -0.003 for
weekly hours of work and -0.021 for services. Moreover, physicians’ service intensity, as measured
by the volume of services provided (in 1996 Can. dollars) per clinical hour of work, decreases with
non-labour income but very slightly, with an elasticity of -0.017 (with p < 0.01).
Results from the third panel indicate that uncompensated own wage elasticity of total weekly
hours is close to 0. This suggests that physicians’ labour supply curve for weekly hours is essentially
vertical. Moreover, the compensated own wage elasticity is positive, although quite small, being
estimated at 0.053 (with p < 0.01). Our results also indicate that services and hours of work are net
complements, as cross compensated wage elasticity of services is positive (= 0.367, with p < 0.01).
The last panel provides results regarding elasticities with respect to changes in the fee for service
(piece rate). The own uncompensated service elasticity is negative and equal to −0.254, with p <
0.01. Thus, the labour supply curve for services is backward-bending. Interestingly, the negative
effect of an increase in the fee per service is much larger (in absolute value) on non-billable services
39This is an approximation since the choice set is discrete and the variations in wage and fee per service are not in-
finitesimal.
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(= −0.443) than on billable services (= −0.110). The compensated own service elasticity is positive
as expected and quite large and significant (= 0.373). Notice also that the compensated elasticity of
weekly hours of work with respect to fee per service is positive but small (= 0.052). As expected, a
compensated increase in the fee per service induces the physician to spend less time in non-clinical
(teaching and administrative) activities and more time to perform clinical services, but again these
effects are small (−0.039 and 0.065, respectively). These results suggest that compensated changes
in the fee for service have a positive and significant impact on physicians’ behaviour—especially on
the volume of their services and their service intensity.
Our results on elasticities suggest that physicians (pediatricians) react to incentives in the direc-
tions predicted by the theory. The compensated own elasticities are all positive and the effects of
non-labour income are all negative on weekly hours of work (except on non-clinical hours) and on
services. However, the compensated and uncompensated, weekly hours elasticities with respect to
wage and the fee for service are very small. This result is consistent with those reported in studies
focusing on hours of work supplied by physicians who are not self-employed: for example, Sloan
(1975); Noether (1986); Saether (2005) found that the wage elasticities are modest or non-signifiant in
this context. The (compensated) service (and service intensity) elasticities with respect to wage and
the fee for service are considerably larger (in absolute value) than those on hours. Finally, we note
that the incentive effects on services provided are generally much larger (in absolute value) than are
those on hours worked. This observation, which will reappear as a common theme throughout our
policy simulations, has possibly important implications for the quality of services provided and is
consistent with the results of Dumont, Fortin, Jacquemet, and Shearer (2008).40
6.3.2 The Observed Reform
We begin our analysis of different reforms by simulating the effects of the observed policy—the
introduction of the MR system as a constrained choice on the part of physicians. We compare
predicted behaviour under FFS (the first column of Table 6) to that under the MR system, taking
account of the probability of being constrained. The budget constraint under MR is then the mix-
ture of the constrained budget constraint and the unconstrained (efficient) budget constraint. The
results are given in the second column of Table 6, labelled ”Group Free MR”. Note that the results
correspond to the average treatment effects (ATE) of the reform and are not to be confounded with
those of the descriptive statistics in Table 2 which approximate the Average Treatment Effects on
the Treated (ATT). These results are instructive in many ways. First, notice the reform increased the
number of weekly hours worked very slightly, by 0.34%. Moreover, this is entirely due to increases
in non-clinical hours which rose by 6.52%; clinical hours in fact decreased by 0.57%. This suggests
that the per diem incorporated into the MR payment system did induce physicians to spend more
40Shearer, Somé, and Fortin (2017) measures the elasticity of hours and services with respect to price changes at a less
aggregated level, among FFS physicians. He also found that services are more sensitive to price changes than hours.
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Table 6: Treatment effects of MR
FFS Group Free MR Individual Free MR Mandatory MR
Practice Variation Practice Variation Practice Variation
Weekly Total Hours 45.77 45.93 0.34% 46.06 0.62% 46.08 0.68%
(1.06) (0.978) (0.000) (0.937) (0.000) (0.935) (0.000)
clinical (hc) 39.92 39.70 -0.57% 39.51 -1.04% 39.53 -0.99%
(0.92) (0.866) (0.000) (0.932) (0.000) (0.931) (0.000)
non clinical (ho) 5.85 6.23 6.52% 6.55 11.96% 6.55 12.04%
(0.62) (0.572) (0.006) (0.725) (0.018) (0.718) (0.017)
Total Servicesa 153.75 145.57 -5.32% 138.76 -9.75% 139.86 -9.03%
(4.16) (4.374) (0.000) (5.351) (0.001) (5.601) (0.001)
Non-billable (SNB) 67.97 61.61 -9.36% 56.31 -17.15% 57.26 -15.75%
(3.05) (3.050) (0.001) (3.716) (0.002) (3.839) (0.002)
Billable (SB) 85.78 83.96 -2.12% 82.45 -3.88% 82.60 -3.71%
(3.03) (2.961) (0.000) (3.008) (0.000) (3.045) (0.000)
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
77.02 73.34 -4.78% 70.24 -8.80% 70.76 -8.13%
(1.55) (1.720) (0.000) (2.373) (0.001) (2.542) (0.001)
Annual incomea (X) 135.68 149.18 9.95% 160.41 18.23% 158.21 16.61%
(3.66) (4.109) (0.000) (4.474) (0.000) (4.454) (0.000)
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behaviour predicted by the model in 2002 depending on whether physicians are paid according to: a mandatory
Fee-for-Service (first column) ; the Mixed Remuneration scheme chosen conditionally on group agreement (second column) ; an MR
system freely chosen on an individual basis (third column) ; or a mandatory MR (last column). The percentage variation provided for each
compensation scheme takes FFS as a benchmark. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parenthesis.
time on administrative and teaching activities. The reform also had important effects on the vol-
ume of services provided. Physicians reduced their supply of services in the order of −5.32%. This
reflects physicians responding to (large) monetary incentives.
As with the elasticities, we see that services are more sensitive than hours seeing patients. The
MR compensation system reduced the marginal payment for services received by physicians (on
average by 30%) and hence the marginal benefit to their completion. This substitution effect is ac-
centuated by the negative income effect on the volume of services associated with the higher annual
income received by MR physicians. Indeed, the physician annual income increased on average by
nearly 10%. This reflects the large per diem payments that MR physicians received, independent of
the number of services provided. The fact that the reform was expensive also raises the question as
to whether or not it could have been enacted for lower cost. We return to this point below in Section
6.3.5. Our results show that service intensity decreased (by 4.78%) with the reform which suggests
that physicians spent more time with their patients under MR.
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6.3.3 Mandatory MR Reform
Given the voluntary nature of the observed reform, a natural question to address is how a manda-
tory MR reform would affect behaviour. We address this within the context of our model by sim-
ulating optimal choices along the MR budget constraint. We then compare the resulting predicted
behaviour to that under FFS. The results are presented in the fourth column of Table 6. They sug-
gest that a mandatory reform would have had considerable effects on services provided (a decrease
of 9.03% relative to FFS) and non-clinical hours (an increase of 12.04% relative to FFS); these are
much larger than under the observed reform. Physicians would also spend more time with patients
– services per hour worked seeing patients would decrease by 8.13% relative to FFS. The cost of the
program would also be significantly affected (an increase of 16.61% relative to FFS).
The mandatory reform changes two things vis-à-vis the observed reform: first, it removes the
choice of the compensation system and second it removes constraints on an individual’s choice of
a MR compensation system. To decompose the overall effect into its component parts, we simu-
lated the observed voluntary reform, removing the constraint on choice. We set ψ = 0, allowing
physicians to choose their compensation system individually along the efficient budget constraint.
The subsequent predicted behaviour is compared to behaviour under FFS. The results are given in
the the third column of Table 6, labelled “Individual Free MR.” They are close to the results from
the mandatory reform. This suggests that constraints on choice are the most important factor in
explaining the difference between the actual and mandatory reforms. Even though workers who
switched to MR were low-productivity physicians, many high-productive physicians—who would
have reacted strongly to the change in compensation system— would have switched to MR if they
had not been constrained in their choice. Physicians who are currently observed under FFS can (on
average) find a practice pattern under MR that provides them with higher income and that they
prefer, but they are constrained from choosing it. Geometrically, this suggests that the line MR in
Figure 1 should be shifted upward so that a large number of pediatricians would choose the MR
system if they were free to do so.41
6.3.4 Selection Effects
Related to the previous subsection, our mixed-logit model allows us to evaluate the consequences of
selection on unobservables on the effect of various reforms. To this end, we use our model to recover
preferences that are specific to the sub-population of physicians choosing each of the two compensa-
tion schemes. MR preferences are computed by drawing the random preference parameters—non-
clinical hours (ho), leisure (l), and billable services SB—from the distribution of preferences, con-
ditional on working under MR. We thus calculate the average vector of utility parameters for this
41This is consistent with the fact that pediatrics is one of the specialities that pushed very hard on government to
introduce the MR system.
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Table 7: Treatment effects: MR-specific preferences
FFS Group Free MR Individual Free MR Mandatory MR
Practice Variation Practice Variation Practice Variation
Weekly Total Hours 46.67 46.82 0.32% 46.94 0.58% 46.97 0.63%
(1.26) (1.168) (0.000) (1.119) (0.000) (1.117) (0.000)
clinical (hc) 40.24 39.98 -0.64% 39.77 -1.18% 39.79 -1.13%
(1.05) (0.985) (0.000) (1.025) (0.000) (1.024) (0.000)
non clinical (ho) 6.43 6.84 6.32% 7.17 11.59% 7.18 11.66%
(0.83) (0.730) (0.005) (0.816) (0.016) (0.812) (0.016)
Total Servicesa 151.37 142.65 -5.76% 135.39 -10.56% 136.38 -9.90%
(4.69) (5.485) (0.000) (7.118) (0.001) (7.364) (0.001)
Non-billable (SNB) 69.17 62.33 -9.88% 56.64 -18.11% 57.50 -16.88%
(3.17) (3.342) (0.001) (4.473) (0.003) (4.650) (0.004)
Billable (SB) 82.21 80.32 -2.29% 78.75 -4.20% 78.89 -4.04%
(3.36) (3.438) (0.000) (3.638) (0.000) (3.672) (0.000)
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
75.23 71.35 -5.15% 68.09 -9.49% 68.56 -8.87%
(1.61) (2.060) (0.000) (3.116) (0.002) (3.263) (0.002)
Annual incomea (X) 133.44 148.03 10.94% 160.18 20.04% 158.16 18.53%
(4.13) (4.891) (0.000) (5.533) (0.001) (5.474) (0.001)
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behaviour predicted by the model in 2002 depending on whether MR physicians are paid according to: a
mandatory Fee-for-Service (first column) ; the Mixed Remuneration scheme chosen conditionally on group agreement (second column) ;
an MR system freely chosen on an individual basis (third column) ; or a mandatory MR (last column). The percentage variation provided
for each compensation scheme takes FFS as a benchmark. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parenthesis.
subgroup, using the approach suggested by Train (2009, p.258-264).42 The FFS-specific preferences
are computed in a similar way, accounting for constraints on choice. Choosing FFS can result either
from a strict preference for this compensation a scheme, or a constrained choice due to the unanim-
ity rule required to switch to the MR system (with a probability ψ). Since ψ has been estimated to
be 46%, this possibility is important and should not be ignored. Based on compensation-specific
preferences (reported in the last two columns of the results table 3), we perform simulations of the
various reforms for each subgroup separately. The comparison of the resulting changes in practice
patterns with those observed in Table 6 provides an evaluation of the importance of selection effects
on unobservables.
Tables 7 and 8 provide results of simulations using MR- and FFS-specific preferences, respec-
tively. In our analysis, we focus on selection effects in the observed Group Free reform. As ex-
pected, one observes that in average MR-specific preferences lead to less services supplied (142.65)
and lower service intensity (71) than FFS-specific preferences (145.7 and 74.04, respectively). More-
42Appendix 7 of the paper provides details about the algorithm used to simulate the impact of the reforms on the
subgroup of MR physicians.
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Table 8: Treatment effects: FFS-specific preferences
FFS Group Free MR Individual Free MR Mandatory MR
Practice Variation Practice Variation Practice Variation
Weekly Total Hours 45.01 45.18 0.38% 45.33 0.70% 45.35 0.76%
(1.11) (1.034) (0.000) (0.990) (0.000) (0.994) (0.000)
clinical (hc) 39.58 39.38 -0.51% 39.22 -0.93% 39.24 -0.87%
(0.95) (0.966) (0.000) (1.039) (0.000) (1.045) (0.000)
non clinical (ho) 5.43 5.80 6.86% 6.11 12.57% 6.12 12.67%
(0.64) (0.596) (0.005) (0.696) (0.016) (0.689) (0.016)
Total Servicesa 153.70 145.79 -5.15% 139.20 -9.44% 140.30 -8.72%
(5.56) (5.221) (0.000) (5.666) (0.001) (5.934) (0.001)
Non-billable (SNB) 67.41 61.26 -9.12% 56.14 -16.72% 57.10 -15.29%
(3.24) (3.036) (0.001) (3.651) (0.002) (3.826) (0.002)
Billable (SB) 86.29 84.52 -2.05% 83.05 -3.75% 83.20 -3.58%
(4.44) (4.275) (0.000) (4.179) (0.000) (4.195) (0.000)
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
77.66 74.04 -4.67% 70.99 -8.59% 71.51 -7.91%
(1.93) (1.877) (0.000) (2.427) (0.001) (2.590) (0.001)
Annual incomea (X) 135.68 148.46 9.42% 159.10 17.26% 156.81 15.58%
(4.94) (4.604) (0.000) (4.689) (0.001) (4.611) (0.001)
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behaviour predicted by the model in 2002 depending on whether FFS physicians are paid according to: a
mandatory Fee-for-Service (first column) ; the Mixed Remuneration scheme chosen conditionally on group agreement (second column) ;
an MR system freely chosen on an individual basis (third column) ; or a mandatory MR (last column). The percentage variation provided
for each compensation scheme takes FFS as a benchmark. Bootstrapped standard errors appear in parenthesis.
over, the impact (in %) of the reform on the volume of services performed based on MR-specific
preferences is negative and a little stronger in absolute value (-5.76%) than based on FFS-specific
preferences (-5.15%).
Given the small differences between figures for MR- and FFS-specific preferences, this suggests
that the problem of selection on unobservables does not seem to be very important in our data,
when one controls for exogenous observable variables (gender and age). This is consistent with
our simulation results corresponding to the mandatory MR reform: the constraints on MR choice
imposed by the observed Group Free reform seem to be much more important than selection in
explaining the considerable impact of the mandatory MR reform on physicians’ behaviour. Our
results are also consistent with the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2. While our simulations
do not seem to indicate important selection on unobservables, that on observables is likely to be
substantial.
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Table 9: Practice under a cost-preserving wage under mandatory MR
FFS Constant % Variable %
cost Var. cost Var.
Weekly Total Hours 45.77 46.35 1.27% 46.08 0.68%
clinical (hc) 39.92 39.63 -0.75% 39.53 -0.99%
non clinical (ho) 5.85 6.73 15.01% 6.55 12.04%
Total Servicesa 153.75 146.83 -4.50% 139.86 -9.03%
Non-billable (SNB) 67.97 62.68 -7.77% 57.26 -15.75%
Billable (SB) 85.78 84.15 -1.90% 82.60 -3.71%
Service intensity
(
= S
NB+SB
hc∗W
)
77.02 74.11 -3.78% 70.76 -8.13%
Annual incomea (X) 135.68 135.68 0.00% 158.21 16.61%
Per Diem (3.5 hours) – 187.96$ 300$
a Thousands of (1996) Can. Dollars.
Note. Average practice behaviour predicted by specification 3 of the model (accounting for observed and partially unobserved het-
erogeneity) in 2002 depending on whether physicians are paid according to: a mandatory Fee-for-Service (first column), the Mandatory
Mixed Remuneration scheme, associated to a per diem that maintain health care costs at a constant level (second and third columns),
and the Mandatory Mixed Remuneration scheme, associated to the actual per diem (fourth and fifth columns).The third and fifth columns
provide the percentage variation in practice induced by the change.
6.3.5 The Effects of (Constant-Cost) Contracts
One striking feature that is highlighted by the simulations in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 is the cost of
the MR contract; the large per diem paid to physicians caused incomes to increase by over 9% in all
versions of the reform investigated in Table 6. It is therefore of interest to investigate whether alter-
native contracts could achieve similar results at lower costs. To do so we concentrate on constant-
cost contracts, that is, contracts that keep annual payments to physicians equal to those observed
pre-reform (under FFS). We restrict attention to a mandatory reform, forcing all physicians to work
under MR. This allows us to evaluate the impact of switching from a FFS to a mandatory MR scheme
on physician practice, at constant aggregate costs.
To investigate physician behaviour under constant-cost contracts, we fix the fee-for-service paid
under MR at the levels observed in the actual MR contract, but allow the per diem to be determined
endogenously at a level that holds expected costs constant.43 The results are given in Table 9 (we
replicate the simulation results of the (variable-cost) mandatory MR from the two last columns
of Table 6 for ease of comparison). The per diem paid to physicians in this case would be $53.70
per hour, or $187.96 per 3.5 hour period (compared to $300 in the observed contract), a reduction
of 37%. By construction, physicians’ annual income growth would be zero relative to FFS under
a constant-cost reform as compared to 16.61% under the variable cost scheme. Moreover, some
43For a given per diem, we calculate the implied probabilities of different practice alternatives. This implies an ex-
pected cost (income) which we compare to the cost under FFS. The numerical procedure iterates over the per diem until
convergence is achieved.
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physician behaviours would change substantially as compared to the variable-cost mandatory MR
system. In particular, the volume of services provided would not decrease by as much as under the
observed reform. Total services would decrease by 4.50% relative to FFS rather than by 9.03% under
the variable-cost reform. This reflects the presence of a smaller income effect. As under the variable-
cost reform, the level of clinical hours of work would not be much influenced by the constant-cost
system, given it small (compensated and uncompensated) elasticities. The service intensity would
therefore decrease (by 3.78%), but much less than under the variable-cost reform (by 8.13%). These
results reinforce the importance of incentives in determining the supply of services. In contrast,
hours worked are relatively insensitive to incentives.
7 Conclusion
We have developed and estimated a structural labour supply model that incorporates service in-
tensity into the standard consumption/leisure tradeoff. This generates endogenous prices since
service intensity affects the opportunity cost of leisure and hours worked affect the marginal return
to service intensity. Allowing for choice among alternative contracts adds further non linearities as
rational individuals locate on the efficient budget constraint. We have applied our model to analyse
the response of physicians to changes in their compensation system, identifying parameters from
the differing incentives between fee-for-service contracts and mixed-remuneration contracts as ob-
served in the Province of Quebec. Discretizing the choice set of physicians allows us to take account
of non linearities in an empirically tractable manner.
We have used our estimates to simulate the effects of alternative policies and compensation
systems, both on physician behaviour and costs. Our results suggest that incentives significantly
affect physicians’ service intensity and the volume of services provided. The observed MR reform
led to a 5.32% reduction in the volume of services provided and to a 4.78% decrease in the service
intensity. The effect on weekly hours was much less pronounced: hours spent at work increased
by 0.34%. A counterfactual mandatory MR reform would have a substantially larger effect on be-
haviour: services would decrease by 9.03% and service intensity would decrease by 8.13%. The cost
per physician would increase by over 16.61%, largely due to the large per diem offered to physicians,
$300 per 3.5 hours. A constant-cost (mandatory) reform, setting the per diem to $187.96 dollars per
3.5 hours would generate substantially smaller effects on physician behaviour: services would de-
crease by 4.50%, and service intensity would decrease by 3.78%. Also, when controlling for gender
and age, our analysis provides little evidence about selection on unobservables in the choice of the
compensation system.
Our results have implications for the empirical application of labour supply models and data
gathering. They demonstrate the importance of extending traditional models to incorporate changes
on service intensity, at least in the health-care sector. The physicians in our sample adjust their be-
haviour much more in terms of the volume of services and service intensity than in terms of time
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spent at work. Ignoring such changes would vastly misrepresent the effects of policies on the sup-
ply of health services. Future work will benefit from additional data sets that incorporate infor-
mation on both labour supply and service intensity. Extending data sets to include information on
health outcomes would also be helpful. Matched physician-patient data sets, allowing researchers
to follow patients through time would allow researchers to compare health outcomes based on the
payment system of physicians permitting further advances in measuring the quality of health care.
Our paper also raises some modelling issues for physician labour supply and measuring treat-
ment effects. In developing our model we have assumed that physicians exercise complete control
over their practice environment, choosing both the number of services to supply and hours to work,
given exogenously determined prices. This makes sense within the context of publicly provided
health-care systems. Yet in market based systems the number of services provided and their prices
are subject to market forces. Extending the model to account for demand-side factors would allow
applications in market-oriented health care systems. We also ignore general-equilibrium effects in
our model. General-equilibrium effects would occur if, for example, there is a transfer of activities
between physicians who chose MR and those who remained on FFS. Economists have begun to
extend structural models to account for general-equilibrium effects in policy evaluation (see, for
example, Lise, Seitz, and Smith, 2004). We leave this for future work.
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A Appendices
A.1 Indexes
Quantities: Let pta stand for the price of the service a at time t and Sta,i for the number of a-type services a
physician i provided at time t. The annual level of services Sti is then measured as:

Sti = ∑a
Sta,i p
1996
a if 1996 ≤ t < 2000,
Sti = ∑a
(Sta,i p
2000
a )
∑
a
S2000a,i p
1996
a
∑
a
S2000a,i p
2000
a
if 2000 ≤ t ≤ 2002.
(23)
The same price are used for weighting billable and non-billable services. The variable Sti in (23) then
stands for either non-billable services, Sti = S
NB
i
t, or billable ones, Sti = S
B
i
t, aggregated using the same price
levels.
Prices: For the same reasons, the weights used for price indexes are the average level of services provided
by FFS physicians. This avoids incorporating into price measures the effect of the variations in services due
to switching to MR. Let Sta denote the average level of billable services of type a provided by all the FFS
physicians belonging to the specialty considered. The price index of services is then given by:

pt =
∑
a
S1996a pta
∑
a
S1996a p1996a
if 1996 ≤ t < 2000,
pt =
∑
a
S2000a pta
∑
a
S2000a p2000a
∑
a
S1996a p2000a
∑
a
S2000a p2000a
if 2000 ≤ t ≤ 2002.
(24)
Once again, we hold constant the weights used for measuring the price index under MR, PFt, since it is
calculated using the average billable services provided by FFS physicians, at MR reduced prices.
A.2 Non-Convex Budget Set
Let the budget set be given by
XM =
{
(X, s, h) ∈ R3 : X− psh− wh ≤ y, s ≥ 0, X ≥ 0
}
.
Let (Xo, so, ho) and (X1, s1, h1) be on the frontier of XM with h1 > ho, s1 > so and
Xo − psoho − who = X1 − ps1h1 − wh1 = y. (25)
For λ ∈ (0, 1), define
(X3, s3, h3) = λ(X1, s1, h1) + (1− λ)(Xo, so, ho). (26)
Convexity requires
X3 − ps3h3 − wh3 ≤ y (27)
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or,
λX1 + (1− λ)Xo − p
[
λs1 + (1− λ)so
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
− w
[
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≤ y. (28)
But
y = λX1 + (1− λ)Xo −
[
λps1h1 + (1− λ)psoho
]
−
[
λwh1 + (1− λ)who
]
. (29)
So (28) can be written
−p
[
λs1 + (1− λ)so
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≤ −p
[
λs1h1 + (1− λ)soho
]
[
λs1 + (1− λ)so
] [
λh1 + (1− λ)ho
]
≥ λs1h1 + (1− λ)soho
λ(λ− 1)s1h1 + λ(λ− 1)soho ≥ λ(λ− 1)s1ho + λ(λ− 1)soh1
s1h1 + soho ≤ s1ho + soh1(
s1 − so
) (
h1 − ho
)
≤ 0.
(30)
But this contradicts h1 > ho, s1 > so, so the budget set is not convex.
A.3 Equivalence
Let (X?, h?, s?) be the unique optimal vector that maximizes U(X, h, s) subject to (X, h, s) ∈ XM where
XM =
{
(X, s, h) ∈ R3 : X− pS− wh ≤ y, s ≥ 0, X ≥ 0, S = sh
}
.
Then (X?, h?, s?) satisfies
U(X?, h?, s?) > U(X′, h′, s′) ∀(X′, h′, s′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, s′) 6= (X?, h?, s?) ⇐⇒
U(X?, h?, S?/h?) > U(X′, h′, S′/h′) ∀(X′, h′, s′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, s′) 6= (X?, h?, s?) ⇐⇒
u(X?, h?, S?) > u(X′, h′, S′) ∀(X′, h′, s′) ∈ XM, (X′, h′, s′) 6= (X?, h?, s?) .
(31)
A.4 Comparative Statics
To perform the comparative statics, we use the transformed utility function u = u(X, h, S). We assume an
interior solution and the quasi-concavity of u(X, h, S) over the relevant region. Let the expenditure function
m(w, p, ū) be the solution to the standard dual program min{X,h,S} X−wh− pS subject to ū− u(X, h, S) ≤ 0.
In our case, the expenditure function yields the minimum amount of non-labour income needed to get ū for
given w and p. Then, from Shephard’s Lemma,
∂m(w, p, ū)
∂w
= −h̃(w, p, ū),
∂m(w, p, ū)
∂p
= −S̃(w, p, ū).
(32)
Also, from the concavity of the expenditure function,
∂m(w, p, ū)2
∂w2
= −∂h̃(w, p, ū)
∂ŵ
≤ 0,
∂m(w, p, ū)2
∂p2
= −∂S̃(w, p, ū)
∂ p̂
≤ 0,
(33)
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which demonstrates the inequalities (6).
Moreover, since the concavity of the expenditure function imposes no restrictions on the signs of the cross
derivatives in wage and price, one has
∂m(w, p, ū)2
∂w∂p
= −∂h̃(w, p, ū)
∂p
>
<
0, (34)
which demonstrates (7). Finally,
s̃(w, p, ū) =
S̃(w, p, ū)
h̃(w, p, ū)
, (35)
from which
η̃s,p = η̃S,p − η̃h,p, (36)
where η̃i,p is the compensated elasticity of i with respect to p, for i = s, S, h, which demonstrates (8).
A.5 Econometric Methodology
A.5.1 The Basic Empirical Model
Let Vij stand for the annual utility of physician i in alternative j that is decomposed into a deterministic
component, uj, and a random term which is independent across alternatives εij. Thus,
Vij = uj + εij, where εij ∼ i.i.d. Gumbel (extreme value type I).
The deterministic component of the quadratic utility function to be maximized is given by 44
uj = γ′zj + z′jβzj + γSNB S
NB
j + b
′
SNB zjS
NB
j + βSNB (S
NB
j )
2, (37)
where the practice characteristics that are fully observable are denoted by
zj = (hoj , T − hoj − hco, SBj , Xj)′,
and those for which we observe a lower bound to the actual number performed, SNBj ,
45 and where
β =

βo β
l
o β
SB
o β
y
o
βlo βl β
SB
l β
y
l
βS
B
o β
SB
l βSB β
y
SB
β
y
o β
y
l β
y
SB βy
 ; γ =

γo
γl
γSB
γy
 ; bSNB =

βS
NB
o
βS
NB
l
βS
B
SNB
β
y
SNB
 .
44In what follows, the individual index i is neglected, where possible, for clarity.
45Recall that MR physicians do not spend all of their time on the per diem. When they perform non-billable services off
the per diem, they are paid for them as a FFS physician would be and we observe the transactions. When they perform
non-billable services on the per diem they are not paid for them and we do not observe the transactions. The number
of non-billable services that are observed for MR physicians is therefore a lower bound to the number of such services
actually performed.
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To begin, we consider the case for which SNB is fully observable. A physician chooses alternative
j if: Vij ≥ Vik, ∀k 6= j. The individual contribution to the likelihood function is the probability of
this event occurring, i.e.,
Lij = P
[
Vij ≥ Vik, ∀k 6= j
]
= P
[
εij ≥ uk − uj + εik, ∀k 6= j
]
=
exp(uj)
J
∑
k=1
exp(uk)
. (38)
A.5.2 Calculation of MR earnings
A number of issues arise in calculating gross income under the MR system (see eq. (12)). First,
a physician’s income depends on the number of per diems claimed. As this is unknown, we must
approximate it. To do so, we assume that each MR physician works the maximum number of per
diems possible for a given number of hours worked, the remainder of his time is then allocated to
FFS.
We estimate the number of (half) per diems worked during a week by
N̂ =
min
{
f loor
(
2×(hc+ho)
d
)
, 28
}
2
, (39)
where d is the number of hours per per diem and 28 represents the maximum number of per diems
that a physician can claim over a two-week period.
Second, recall that we distinguish between billable services provided under the per diem, de-
noted SBFFS, for which the physician is paid a discounted fee, αp, and those provided outside of the
per diem, denoted SBMR, for which the physician is paid the regular fee, p. Given that we do not ob-
serve whether or not a given service was remunerated under the per diem, we use θSB and (1− θ)SB
to estimate SBMR and S
B
FFS, respectively. Here θ is the proportion of time spent under the per diem,
estimated as the share of total hours worked in a week under the per diem and given by
θ̂ =
d N̂
hc + ho
. (40)
Hence we attribute billable services to MR and FFS in the same proportion as we attribute hours
worked to MR and FFS.
Consumption in alternative j, in year t, under MR is then given by46
XMRj,t = 46N̂jDt + ptSNBj + θ̂jαpt(SBj ) + (1− θ̂j)ptSBj , (41)
46Note that the fact that we only observe a lower bound to SNB does not affect our calculations of income. This is
because the observed lower bound represents the exact number of non-billable acts performed outside of the per diem
period where they were remunerated. The unobservable part of SNB is provided within the per diem period and does not
affect income.
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where N̂j is the number of (half) per diems worked in alternative j, Dt is the payment per (half) per
diem in year t, and θ̂j is the estimated share of total hours worked in a week in alternative j attributed
to the per diem.
We accounted for government imposed income ceilings and regional income differentials as
discussed in footnote (15). The actual provisions governing regional remuneration rate calculations
involve a wide variety of individual characteristics—such as city of practice – not included in the
data set. However, our data contains each physician’s quarterly income before and after the cor-
rection for the regionally differentiated remuneration rate. We therefore approximate the actual
regionally-differentiated remuneration rate facing physician i, and denoted τi, as the ratio of the
two reported levels of income over the whole sample period.
The actual level of income ceilings during the period is publicly available from government
authorities in charge of physician compensation. However, these ceilings depend on the establish-
ment in which the services were provided, information that is not available to us.47To take account
of these exceptions in a tractable manner we calculate the average percentage of time that pediatri-
cians spent in establishments where income ceilings were applied. The relevant ceiling for physician
i, is then taken to be the actual income ceiling adjusted for the average percentage of time spent in
establishments where the cap applies.
With these elements in hand, the actual consumption in each alternative is predicted according
to equations (20) and (41).48 To convert consumption into real terms we deflate actual (nominal)
consumption in each alternative using the price index provided by Statistics Canada. The average
inflation rate for the whole period is 1.92%. Overall, our strategy for approximating consumption
in each alternative proved to be a precise predictor of the observed income of physicians included
in our sample.49
47For example, emergency services were excluded from the capped income prior to 2001.
48For simplicity, we ignore income taxes in our analysis. However, since most physicians in our sample period have a
yearly income implying the highest marginal (provincial + federal) tax rate and since there has been no tax reform over
our period, the marginal tax rate is likely to be constant for most physicians.
49A regression of physicians’ observed income on their predicted income yielded a R2 of 0.83, with a coefficient of 0.97
(standard error = 0.005) and a non significant intercept.
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A.6 Algorithm to Simulate Selection Effects
Let
dMRj =
1 if XMRj > XFFSj ;0 else .
To simulate the average κ in the sub-group who would select MR, where κ is the (unknown) vector
of the parameters of the individual utility functions:
1. Draw κr from g(κ), its asymptotic distribution.
2. Calculate Pr(j|κr) for each alternative j = {1, 2, . . . , J}
3. Calculate Pr(MR|κr) = ∑Jj=1 Pr(j|κr)dMRj
4. Repeat (1)—(3) R times, saving κr and Pr(MR|κr) at each iteration
5. Calculate
ωr =
Pr(MR|κr)
∑Rr=1 Pr(MR|κr)
, r = 1, 2, . . . , R.
6. Calculate κ̂MR = ∑Rr=1 ω
rκr, the average beta for the sub-group in the population who would
select MR.
We can then use κ̂MR to do simulations for the sub-group who prefer MR. We can then do the same
for FFS physicians to calculate selection effects. It is easy to extend the algorithm to account for
constraints on MR physicians choices associated with Group Free MR reform (i.e., the introduction
of ψ).
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